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“TIME ENOUGH” FOR SCRUTINY: THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE CASE FOR
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
Benjamin A. Ellis*
INTRODUCTION
When analyzing challenges to laws that burden a constitutional right, courts
generally adopt some analytical framework for determining whether the burden the
law places on exercising that right is appropriate. How are lower courts to decide
which analytical framework to apply when the Supreme Court has not established
one for a particular doctrinal area? This is the current situation in contemporary
Second Amendment jurisprudence. Having interpreted the Second Amendment to
protect an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense in
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court confirmed a constitutional right
without providing an answer to the framework question.2
Specifically, the Court did not apply any of the traditional levels of judicial scru-
tiny to the law at issue in Heller.3 Instead, the Court cautioned against deciding a
question it felt was unnecessary on the facts before it.4 “[N]othing” in the Court’s
opinion, however, “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”5 The Court had little to
say about these “presumptively lawful” prohibitions, except that “there will be time
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1 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2 Id. at 628–29, 634–35 (noting that the law at issue would “fail constitutional muster”
under “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional
rights,” and declining to establish a specific level of scrutiny for such challenges).
3 See id.
4 See id. at 628–29.
5 Id. at 626.
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enough to expound upon the historical justifications for [them] . . . if and when those
exceptions come before us.”6 No such challenges have since been decided by the
Court. The Courts of Appeals, however, have dealt with many of these exceptions,
and their approaches are crucial to answering the scrutiny question.7
Since Heller, the Courts of Appeals have, by a large majority, adopted some
form of intermediate scrutiny in most Second Amendment challenges.8 In 2014,
however, the Sixth Circuit considered a challenge to a federal law banning gun pos-
session for any individual who previously had been committed to a mental institution,
or who had been adjudicated as a mental defective.9 In Tyler v. Hillsdale County
Sheriff’s Department (Tyler I ),10 a panel of the Sixth Circuit became the first Court
of Appeals to apply strict scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge.11 The Sixth
Circuit panel presented several arguments for the general application of strict scru-
tiny over intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases.12 Moreover, Tyler I
was the first case in which a federal Court of Appeals has heard a challenge to a law
restricting gun possession based on mental heath concerns.13
Less than six months after the Tyler I decision, the Sixth Circuit vacated the
opinion and granted a rehearing en banc.14 Sitting en banc, the court in Tyler v.
Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department (Tyler II )15 rejected the previous panel’s
conclusion that strict scrutiny applies in Second Amendment challenges to laws re-
stricting gun possession based on mental health concerns.16 The Sixth Circuit thus
fell in line with many of the other circuits in applying intermediate scrutiny in such
cases.17 Although the Sixth Circuit no longer splits with the other circuits on the
scrutiny question, the general discussion of scrutiny in Tyler I and analysis of the
arguments in favor of strict scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges is instruc-
tive. The Tyler I court’s opinion provided a more in-depth discussion of the scrutiny
question than any other earlier circuit court’s opinion, marshaling many different
6 Id. at 635.
7 See infra Section III.A.
8 See infra Section III.A.; see also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I ), 775
F.3d 308, 326 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir.
Apr. 21, 2015) (“The general trend, [in Second Amendment cases], has been in favor of some
form of intermediate scrutiny.”).
9 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 311.
10 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir.
Apr. 21, 2015).
11 Id. at 311, 328–29 (noting that the decision to apply strict scrutiny in this case put the
Sixth Circuit at odds with the other circuits hearing Second Amendment challenges).
12 Id. at 326–29.
13 Id. at 311.
14 Id. at 308.
15 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
16 Id. at 690–92.
17 Id. at 692–93; see infra text accompanying notes 201–09, 211.
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arguments in favor of strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny.18 Importantly, the
panel’s arguments were not dependent upon the specific facts in Tyler I, but, rather,
if sound, would support the adoption of strict scrutiny across many types of Second
Amendment challenges.19 Although the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately
rejected the application of strict scrutiny in the case of a law burdening the Second
Amendment right due to mental health concerns,20 because the Supreme Court has
not yet decided the scrutiny question, the issue remains open.
This Note considers the question of which analytical framework, or level of
judicial scrutiny, is applicable to Second Amendment challenges. Specifically, it
considers which of the traditional levels of judicial scrutiny is applicable in Second
Amendment challenges to laws that restrict gun possession for those with, or with
a history of, mental health issues. Although couched within the discussion of gun
possession statutes related to mental health, the arguments may apply to Second
Amendment jurisprudence more broadly.
Of the traditional approaches, intermediate scrutiny, and not strict scrutiny, is
the better approach. In his Heller dissent, Justice Breyer argued for an interest-
balancing approach that is less stringent than strict scrutiny.21 This approach allows
a substantial degree of deference to legislatures, which is necessary for effective gun
control, as argued below.22 The adoption by the lower federal courts of a level of
scrutiny less demanding than strict scrutiny, namely, intermediate scrutiny,23 does
not alone establish its appropriateness. It strongly suggests, however, that intermedi-
ate scrutiny is a doctrinally acceptable and practically workable standard in evaluat-
ing laws subject to Second Amendment challenges. This Note suggests this situation
has the effect of shifting the burden of proof onto those who would apply the more
stringent strict scrutiny standard. Three arguments in favor of strict scrutiny are
considered below, but, as this Note argues, all three fail.24 Each of the arguments
either proves too much or is ultimately self-defeating.25 Finally, it is suggested that
strict scrutiny may not only be non-preferable, but may be doctrinally impossible in
Second Amendment challenges.26
Importantly, establishing that intermediate scrutiny is generally preferable to
strict scrutiny does not foreclose the possibility that strict scrutiny may sometimes
be applicable. Some Courts of Appeals have held that when the law in question
18 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 322–30.
19 See id.
20 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690–92.
21 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I
would simply adopt . . . an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.”).
22 See infra Section I.A.
23 See infra Section III.A.
24 See infra Section III.B.
25 See infra Section III.B.
26 See infra Section III.B and text accompanying notes 242–48.
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burdens “the core” of the Second Amendment right, strict scrutiny is applicable.27
If intermediate scrutiny is the generally applicable standard, the question then be-
comes whether some form of intermediate scrutiny is capable of providing the ap-
propriate deference to legislatures, while simultaneously respecting the core right
of the Second Amendment. Because intermediate scrutiny is not a unitary standard,
and admits of strong and weak readings, it can accomplish this balance.28 All else
being equal, a single, flexible standard is preferable to having two distinct standards.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment jurisprudence
in Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago29 and argues that the Heller majority’s
concern that an interest-balancing approach would give judges too much discretion
is misguided.30 Indeed, an approach less demanding than strict scrutiny is necessary
to ensure the appropriate deference to legislatures.31 Part II argues that, contrary to the
views of a minority of judges, the scrutiny question in this context matters.32 Part II
also introduces the facts and reasoning of Tyler I.33 Part III provides a tour of the
Courts of Appeals, a discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s recent en banc decision in
Tyler II, and draws certain lessons from the majority adoption of intermediate scru-
tiny among the circuits.34 The Part then goes on to consider the arguments in favor of
strict scrutiny and against intermediate scrutiny, and finds that all of the arguments
fail.35 Finally, Part III argues that the correct conception of intermediate scrutiny
solves the problem of protecting the core right of the Second Amendment.36 There-
fore, strict scrutiny has no place in Second Amendment jurisprudence.
I. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER AND THE SCRUTINY QUESTION
Contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence begins with the Supreme
Court’s 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller.37 There, the Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep a firearm in the home for
the purpose of self-defense.38 Two years later, in McDonald, the Court reiterated its
27 See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1168 n.15 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Inter-
mediate scrutiny is not appropriate, however, for cases involving the destruction of a right at
the core of the Second Amendment.”), rev’d, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to
laws burdening the “core right of self-defense in the home”), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1058 (2011).
28 See infra Section III.C.
29 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
30 See infra Part I.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part II.
33 See infra Section II.B.
34 See infra Section III.A.
35 See infra Section III.B.
36 See infra Section III.C.
37 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
38 See id. at 635 (striking down District of Columbia handgun ban).
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position in Heller and held that the Second Amendment applies to the states via
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation.39 The Heller Court, however, in making its
pronouncements on the Amendment’s proper interpretation, left many other issues
unresolved and questions unanswered.40
This Part looks at the Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment and
notes a few of these unresolved issues and unanswered questions. Specifically, this
Part addresses the Court’s assertion that certain restrictions on Second Amendment
rights are “presumptively lawful,”41 and its reluctance to decide the question of
which level of judicial scrutiny applies in Second Amendment challenges.42 Justice
Breyer’s interest-balancing approach and its relevance to the scrutiny question are
also discussed.43 Finally, this Part introduces the two-step analysis adopted by many
of the Courts of Appeals in the wake of Heller and McDonald.44
A. The Heller Court on the Scrutiny Question
The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.”45 The Heller Court considered a District of Columbia handgun
restriction making it a crime to possess an unregistered handgun.46 This restriction
also effectively prohibited the registration of handguns.47 The Court held that the
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep a gun in the home for pur-
poses of self-defense.48 The Court struck down the law in question on the grounds
that the “inherent right of self-defense” is “central to the Second Amendment right.”49
The District of Columbia’s total prohibition on handgun possession, even in the
home, violated that right.50
Although the Court recognized a strong Second Amendment right, it noted that
like most rights, the right protected by the Second Amendment “is not unlimited[;]”
39 561 U.S. at 791 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).
40 The Court did not “undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of
the Second Amendment.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
41 Id. at 627 n.26.
42 See id. at 628–29.
43 See id. at 687–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44 See infra Section I.B.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
46 Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (majority opinion).
47 Id. at 574–75 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.1(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001))
(“The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry
an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited.”).
48 Id. at 635.
49 Id. at 628.
50 Id. at 628–29.
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nor has it been historically understood to be unlimited.51 Therefore, it would appear
that certain restrictions on personal gun ownership may survive constitutional
challenges even under Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.52
Indeed, the Court suggested a number of such possible restrictions.53 The ma-
jority was clear that, though it declined to
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in [its] opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbid-
ding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings.54
These kinds of restrictions amount to “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”55
These “presumptively lawful” exceptions concern both restrictions on the types of
places in which firearms may be possessed and restrictions on who can possess a
firearm.56 Because the right recognized by the Heller Court concerns “law-abiding,
responsible citizens,” it appears that certain classes of individuals may be “disquali-
fied from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”57
Importantly, these statements concerning presumptively lawful restrictions on
firearm possession are dicta.58 Some courts, however, including the Sixth Circuit in
Tyler I & II, take these statements seriously, but do not find them dispositive of the
issues at hand.59 This is at least in part because these presumptively lawful excep-
tions were repeated and reaffirmed by the Court in McDonald.60
51 Id. at 626 (“From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts
routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever
in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (citations omitted)).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 269 (2d Cir.
2015) (holding that “New York and Connecticut[’s prohibitions of] assault weapons and
large-capacity magazines do not violate the Second Amendment.”).
53 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
54 Id. at 626 (footnote omitted).
55 Id. at 627 n.26.
56 See id. at 626–27.
57 Id. at 635.
58 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 317 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Heller Court’s state-
ments to the effect that “the Second Amendment right to possess firearms does not extend to
all individuals” is dicta), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
59 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (noting that the court was bound
to follow Supreme Court dicta, but stating that Heller “[did] not resolve this case[,]” but
merely “established a presumption that such bans were lawful”); Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 317
(stating that the court could not “resolve this case” simply by relying on this dicta).
60 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
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These dicta raise a number of questions. First, how are courts to understand the
meaning of “presumptively lawful?” Second, do restrictions on gun possession
relating to the mental heath, or mental health history, of an individual, such as
§ 922(g)(4) of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968,61 fall within these exceptions?
And, finally, what, if anything, does this “presumptively lawful” language tell us
about determining the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable in cases concerning
laws falling under these exceptions?
Consider first the traditional levels of scrutiny. To survive intermediate scrutiny,
a law “must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”62 Strict
scrutiny is more demanding, making it more difficult for the challenged law to pass
constitutional muster, and, thus, making it more likely a court will strike it down.63
The more demanding approach of strict scrutiny requires that the law in question
“further[ ] a compelling interest and [be] narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”64
Indeed, challenged laws, with one doctrinal area exception, are more often than not
struck down under strict scrutiny.65
The Heller Court, however, declined to determine a standard of scrutiny for
Second Amendment analysis.66 The Court reasoned that “[u]nder any of the stan-
dards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,” the law
under consideration “would fail constitutional muster.”67 The Court did, however,
61 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012) (making it unlawful for any individual who “has been
adjudicated as a mental defective” or “has been committed to a mental institution” to possess
a firearm).
62 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
63 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1267
(2007) (stating that many commentators consider strict scrutiny to be “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact”). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that laws may
be upheld under strict scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
64 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (plurality opinion of Roberts, C.J.)).
65 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006). Winkler’s study of fed-
eral court decisions between 1990 and 2003, concerning 459 decisions across five doctrinal
areas (religious liberty, freedom of association, suspect class discrimination, fundamental
rights, and freedom of speech), found that the survival rate of laws subject to strict scrutiny
was on average thirty percent. Id. at 810, 815. Laws affecting all rights except religious
liberty were struck down more often than not under strict scrutiny, with laws affecting
religious liberty only being struck down under strict scrutiny in forty-one percent of cases.
See id. at 815. Note, however, that the right to bear arms is not among the rights considered
in this study. Id. Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, no federal court prior to the
Sixth Circuit in Tyler I applied strict scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges. See supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
66 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
67 Id.
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rule out rational basis review, without commenting on the other traditional interme-
diate or strict scrutiny approaches.68
Insisting that “[t]he question matters,” Justice Breyer, in his dissent, took the
majority to task for not deciding the scrutiny question.69 Justice Breyer argued that
the majority was simply wrong to claim that the District of Columbia handgun ban
would fail under any standard of scrutiny.70 First, the law in Heller would survive
rational basis review.71 Preventing gun-related accidents and violence by restricting
the possession of handguns bears, at the very least, a “rational relation[ ]” to this
“‘legitimate’ life-saving objective.”72
Second, the result of applying strict scrutiny to laws restricting firearm posses-
sion is “far from clear,” because the majority “implicitly” rejected strict scrutiny “by
broadly approving” the set of presumptively lawful exceptions.73 Indeed, Justice
Breyer suggested that the “adoption of a true strict-scrutiny standard for evaluating
gun regulations would be impossible[,]” because nearly every regulation on gun
possession will aim to further a compelling government interest—namely, protecting
citizens through prevention of crime and ensuring public safety.74 Because the purpose
of almost any gun regulation will be to further a compelling government interest,
what remains in the analysis is to determine whether the regulation “impermissibly
burdens” the Second Amendment right in furthering that interest.75 This involves,
in practice, if not in theory, an interest-balancing inquiry.76
Instead of avoiding the scrutiny question in Second Amendment challenges,
Justice Breyer would have adopted “an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.”77 Under
such an approach, the question becomes “whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary ef-
fects upon other important governmental interests.”78 In the course of such an inquiry,
courts typically defer to the judgment of the legislature, which is better positioned
to make determinations of fact and judgments concerning the effectiveness of the
regulations.79 Though Justice Breyer did not explicitly identify his proposed standard
68 Id. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate con-
stitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).
69 See id. at 687–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 687.
71 Id. at 687–88.
72 Id. at 688.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 689.
75 See id.
76 Id. (“[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice
turn into an interest-balancing inquiry . . . .”).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 689–90 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
79 Id. at 690 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997) (“In
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with intermediate scrutiny, it appears to be more demanding than rational basis, but
less demanding than strict scrutiny.
Consider how a law banning the possession of firearms by those individuals
suffering from mental illness would fare under Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing
approach. Congress’s purpose in enacting § 922(g) was to protect the public against
firearm violence committed by individuals who are more likely to pose a threat to
others or to themselves.80 Is stripping the right to bear arms from individuals
meeting the above criteria out of proportion with the benefits purportedly likely to
be had in reduction of self-harm and harm to others via gun violence? The answer
to the question is not obvious and would likely require, under this approach, an
empirical investigation of the link between mental illness and gun violence. If that
link is sufficiently strong, then the restriction is more likely to be upheld.
Though the question cannot be answered here, the important point is that there
must be some sort of means-end analysis to make a determination. But even here,
the interest-balancing approach would be deferential to legislatures in answering
these questions.81 It is simply not enough to accept the mental health restriction as
“rationally related” to this government interest, without considering the force of the
right recognized in Heller.82 A strict scrutiny analysis’s presumption that mental
health restrictions are unconstitutional is likewise inappropriate.83
The majority in Heller disavowed the analysis proposed by Justice Breyer,
calling it a “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”84 The majority distin-
guished Justice Breyer’s approach from the traditional levels of scrutiny, instead
characterizing it as a “freestanding” interest-balancing approach.85 In rejecting this
approach, the majority noted that no other enumerated constitutional rights are
subject to this kind of interest balancing and that this test would remove any guarantee
provided by the right if it were subject to judges’ “assessments of its usefulness.”86
The majority was primarily concerned with giving judges too much discretion in
determining whether the right to bear arms may be subordinated to a governmental
applying [an interest-balancing] standard the Court normally defers to a legislature’s em-
pirical judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater
institutional factfinding capacity.”)).
80 See United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 605 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The title of the
statute, the Gun Control Act of 1968, leaves no doubt that the statutory purpose is to limit
or control the possession of firearms. The statutory structure indicates that, in enacting
section 922(g), Congress sought only to bar the possession of firearms by certain types of
persons that it considered dangerous.”).
81 Heller, 554 U.S. at 690 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 688–89.
83 See id. (stating that the “constitutionality [of many gun regulations] under a strict-
scrutiny standard would be far from clear”).
84 Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
85 Id.
86 Id.
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interest of protecting citizens from gun violence.87 These concerns arguably also
counsel against adopting a less demanding, more deferential level of scrutiny, such
as intermediate scrutiny.
The Court’s concern is misplaced. Concerns about judicial discretion, or even
activism, may take two forms in this context. On the one hand, the Heller majority’s
concern was that an interest-balancing approach would fail in its application to
respect the right protected by the Second Amendment.88 Arguably, judges applying
such an approach would be more likely to uphold laws curbing Second Amendment
rights in a way that is inconsistent with that right being fundamental. The interest-
balancing approach would therefore be inconsistent with the holdings of Heller89
and McDonald.90 Though Justice Breyer does not identify his interest-balancing ap-
proach with intermediate scrutiny, the approach is certainly less stringent than strict
scrutiny. Therefore, concerns about judicial discretion of this type counsels against
adopting intermediate scrutiny.
The contrary concern about judicial discretion or activism is that the Heller
majority’s position may result in judges routinely striking down gun control laws
under a demanding form of scrutiny. The current debate about gun control is ex-
tremely complex.91 In crafting effective gun control focused on considerations of
mental health, there are a myriad of problems.92 The states have dealt with the
problem of gun possession by the mentally ill in a variety of ways.93 Some states
“follow the lead of [§ 922(g)(4)],” and restrict gun possession for anyone previously
involuntarily committed to a mental institution or adjudicated as a mental defec-
tive.94 Other states expand the restriction to include those voluntarily committed to
a mental institution.95 A minority of states, such as Hawaii, prohibit gun possession
87 Id. at 634–35 (“A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its
usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 634.
90 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (noting that “an interest-balancing test [was] . . . specifically
rejected”).
91 Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have A Right to Bear
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2013) (detailing recent incidents of gun violence,
the political debate surrounding gun ownership restrictions for the mentally ill, and various
doctrinal challenges after Heller).
92 Id. at 1–3 (noting the political issues surrounding gun control and the various methods
of interpreting the Supreme Court’s dictum on whether the mentally ill fall within the scope
of the Second Amendment’s protections).
93 Id. at 12 (noting three distinct approaches states have taken).
94 Id. at 12 & n.78 (including Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah).
95 Id. at 12 & n.79 (including Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, and
Massachusetts).
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“by anyone who ‘[i]s or has been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral,
emotional, or mental disorder . . . .’”96
These restrictions aim to reduce gun violence—violence which may cause harm
to others or lead to self-harm.97 In addition to the variation among state gun restric-
tions, the evidence that the mentally ill pose a higher risk of harm to others or self-
harm is itself complicated.98 A variety of factors are at play in determining whether
the mentally ill are more likely to commit acts of violence with a firearm. For in-
stance, the nature of the mental illness can vary the degree to which an individual
is disposed to violence generally.99 One study found “that 6.81% of people with a
serious mental illness reported violent behavior in the past year . . . .”100 Only 2.05%
of people without a serious mental illness reported such behavior.101 Within the
former group, however, schizophrenics had a higher rate of weapon use than
individuals with other types of mental illness or those without.102 Moreover, schizo-
phrenics “were almost twenty times more likely to commit homicide.”103
Drug use by the mentally ill also complicates the situation. Individuals with
mental illness who also used drugs reported a “significantly higher prevalence of
violence . . . than among [those who did not use drugs].”104 The crucial finding,
however, is that the mentally ill are more susceptible to drug abuse, which can lead
to a higher rate of commission of violent acts.105
To be clear, the purpose of this discussion is not to claim that any particular gun
control measure targeting the mentally ill or those with a history of mental illness
is the correct approach. The purpose is simply to make clear that the problem of
establishing effective gun control to reduce violence committed by the mentally ill
is incredibly complex. The data supporting the finding that the mentally ill are more
likely to commit acts of violence with a gun is complicated by the specific nature
of the mental illness and the interplay between mental illness and drug use.106 This
96 Id. at 12 (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 143-7(c)(3) (2011)).
97 Id. (“These restrictions can be justified, if at all, by the government’s interest in reduc-
ing gun injuries and deaths. The causes may include accidents, aggressive acts, and self-harm.”).
98 See id. at 12–22 (arguing that the evidence supporting the proposition that the mentally
ill pose a greater threat of gun violence is both complicated by a variety of other factors and,
to varying degrees, disputed in the literature on the subject).
99 Id. at 14.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 15 (“[S]chizophreni[cs] had the highest weapon use: 8.58% as compared with
0.40% of individuals without a disorder.”).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 16.
105 See John Monahan et al., The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study Revisited:
Two Views Ten Years After Its Initial Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 147, 149 (2008)
(“Mental disorder has a significant effect on violence by increasing people’s susceptibility
to substance abuse.”).
106 See id.; Vars & Young, supra note 91, at 16.
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complexity suggests that crafting legislation to deal with the problem is a daunting
and fact-intensive enterprise. For these reasons, it may be difficult for legislatures
to craft gun laws that narrowly target the appropriate groups or behaviors. It may be
necessary for Congress to “cast a wider net than is necessary to perfectly remove the
harm” posed by gun possession by the mentally ill.107 The hope, of course, is that as
the problem becomes better understood, that net may shrink.
The benefit of a prophylactic approach, like § 922(g)(4),108 is that it “obviate[s]
the necessity for large numbers of individualized determinations.”109 The narrow
tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny, would likely render vast amounts of gun
restrictions unconstitutional,110 thus undermining both Congress’s and the States’
attempts at combating gun violence by the mentally ill. Far from resulting in judicial
activism, a less stringent approach is likely to be more deferential to legislatures.
Congress and the States would be able to craft legislation to deal with this complex
problem without a high likelihood that these efforts would be struck down before
their effectiveness is determined. The less stringent approach, however, does not
give legislatures free reign to pass any laws “rationally related” to minimizing gun
violence, as the Court has expressly ruled out rational basis review.111 Therefore, a
standard weaker than strict scrutiny but stronger than rational basis review provides
the best method for allowing legislatures to craft effective gun control measures
without eviscerating the right to bear arms recognized in Heller and McDonald. It
remains to be determined exactly what form this level of scrutiny should take.
To take stock, the Heller Court indicated that “longstanding” restrictions on gun
possession by certain classes of individuals, e.g., felons, the mentally ill, are pre-
sumptively lawful, but did not determine the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second
Amendment challenges.112 The Court did rule out rational basis, however, which
leaves intermediate scrutiny and the more demanding standard of strict scrutiny.113
107 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 332 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
108 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012).
109 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 782 (1975).
110 See Winkler, supra note 65, at 815.
111 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
112 Id. at 626–27 & n.26.
113 Two other approaches are worth mentioning here. Eugene Volokh has argued for a
Second Amendment analytical framework that does away with the traditional levels of
scrutiny, and instead suggests courts should recognize four different categories of justifi-
cations for restrictions on Second Amendment rights: scope, burden, danger reduction, and
government as proprietor. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1443 (2009). Stacey Sobel, on the other hand, has argued that Second Amendment cases
should be reviewed under the undue burden test utilized in abortion cases. Stacy L. Sobel,
The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 489, 489 (2012). Discussion of each of these approaches is beyond the scope
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Strict scrutiny would undermine legislatures’ ability to pass effective gun control
measures. A less stringent form of scrutiny would allow prophylactic measures,
while simultaneously placing a check on how legislatures craft this legislation.
B. The Two-Step Analysis of the Circuit Courts
The Heller Court’s indecision on the scrutiny question has left federal district
and circuit courts with little guidance as to how to determine the appropriate level
of scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges. The Sixth Circuit, and others, have
developed a two-step approach to Second Amendment challenges.114 The analysis
begins by determining whether the challenged statute falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment right as it was understood at the time of the framing.115 If the
challenged law burdens conduct not protected by the Second Amendment as under-
stood at the time of the framing, the analysis ceases.116 If, however, this cannot be
established, the court must apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.117 This second
step is why the scrutiny question matters in Second Amendment analysis. Some
judges, however, have argued that the analysis should stop at step one.118 The next
part takes up this issue and introduces the facts and the Sixth Circuit panel’s deci-
sion in Tyler I.119
II. DOES THE SCRUTINY QUESTION MATTER?
Before considering the question of which level of scrutiny applies to the Second
Amendment, there is a threshold question: Does the scrutiny question even matter?
The two-step analysis’s second step implies that it does, but a small minority of judges
have argued that the analysis stops after the first step—the purely historical ap-
proach.120 The historical approach rejects the application of any form of scrutiny to
of this Note, as it seeks to answer the scrutiny question along the lines of one of the tra-
ditional levels of scrutiny applied in constitutional cases.
114 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308,
317–18 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
115 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 685; Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 317–18.
116 See, e.g., United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 375 (2012); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1158 (2011).
117 See Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95.
118 See infra Part II.
119 See infra Part II.
120 See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Heller and McDonald didn’t just reject interest balancing. The
Court went much further by expressly rejecting Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny
approach, disclaiming cost-benefit analysis, and denying the need for empirical inquiry. By
doing so, the Court made clear . . . that strict and intermediate scrutiny are inappropriate.”);
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Second Amendment challenges.121 Additionally, the Heller Court and the Sixth Circuit
in Tyler I suggested that the scrutiny question alone did not decide the cases.122 In
Heller, the Court said the District of Columbia’s handgun ban was unconstitutional
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated consti-
tutional rights.”123 The Tyler I court, though arguing for the application of strict
scrutiny, predicted that “the application of strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny
will not generally affect how other circuits decide various challenges to federal
firearm regulations.”124
The historical approach has significant difficulties in application, particularly
to gun restrictions relating to mental illness. The Tyler I court’s prediction is also
questionable. Therefore, the question of scrutiny matters.
A. The Purely Historical Approach
Restrictions such as § 922(g)(4)’s restriction on gun possession for the mentally
ill present a challenge for the historical approach. It is not clear or conclusive that
restricting gun possession rights for the mentally ill (or for that matter, those pre-
viously committed to a mental institution) burdens the right protected by the Second
Amendment as understood at the time of the framing.125 As one commentator put it,
“[o]ne searches in vain through eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifi-
cally excluding the mentally ill from firearms ownership.”126 Laws restricting gun
possession by the mentally ill are a twentieth-century creation.127 Without such laws
in the eighteenth century, it is therefore difficult to determine the legal limits of gun
possession by the mentally ill at the time of the founding.
see also Allen Rostron, The Continuing Battle Over the Second Amendment, 78 ALB. L. REV.
819, 821 (2015) (“[A] minority view has arisen to challenge the general consensus in the lower
courts, with a small number of judges . . . insisting that Second Amendment questions instead
must be answered on the basis of nothing other than constitutional text, history, and tradition.”).
121 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1282 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (stating that because
“Heller and McDonald rejected the use of balancing tests—including, therefore, strict or
intermediate scrutiny—in fleshing out the scope of the Second Amendment right[,]” such
standards are inapplicable in the Second Amendment context, and a categorical approach
based on “text, history, and tradition” is required).
122 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308,
329 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
124 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 329.
125 See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of A Theory: District of Columbia
v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1376–77 (noting the Uniform Fire Arms Act of 1930, which “prohibited delivery
of a pistol to any person of ‘unsound mind’” (footnote omitted)).
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The purely historical approach meets with significant shortcomings.128 The
approach is difficult to apply due to the lack of specific gun restriction measures at
the time of the founding.129 Additionally, the approach is the minority view in the
federal courts.130 This points toward the need to adopt some form of means-end
scrutiny for restrictions on Second Amendment rights. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
panel concluded that “[h]istory, text, and tradition, considered alone, are inconclu-
sive” and that the “Second Amendment as understood in 1791 extended to at least
some individuals previously committed to mental institutions.”131
B. Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department
The Sixth Circuit panel’s suggestion that the scrutiny question does not matter
is incorrect.132 Although applying strict scrutiny instead of intermediate scrutiny may
not have led to a different outcome in Tyler I,133 when the scope of the question is
broadened to mental health restrictions on gun possession generally, this is arguably
not the case. To appreciate this distinction, and to bring the issues into sharper relief,
consider the facts and reasoning in Tyler I.
In 1986, a Michigan probate court committed Tyler to a mental institution when
his daughters became concerned that he posed a danger to himself following a
messy divorce.134 The probate court found that Tyler was, at the time, mentally ill,
and that he posed a danger to himself and potentially to others.135 Tyler remained at
the mental health facility for less than one month and following his release showed
no signs of mental health issues.136 Although a 2012 psychological evaluation found
128 Id. at 1378 (“Specific eighteenth-century laws disarming the mentally ill . . . simply
do not exist.”).
129 Id.
130 See Rostron, supra note 120, at 822 (“A small band of [judges] . . . call[ ] for a rigidly
and purely backward looking approach.”).
131 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 322 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015). The Sixth Circuit sitting en banc agreed. Tyler II, 837 F.3d
678, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“In the face of what is at best ambiguous historical
support, it would be peculiar to conclude that § 922(g)(4) does not burden conduct within the
ambit of the Second Amendment as historically understood . . . . [P]eople who have been
involuntarily committed are not categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.”
(citation omitted)).
132 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 329.
133 See id. at 344 (Gibbons, J., concurring) (stating that “Tyler has a viable Second Amend-
ment claim under either degree of scrutiny[,]” while expressing reservations about the
application of strict scrutiny to Tyler’s case).
134 Id. at 313–14 (majority opinion).
135 Id. at 314.
136 Id.
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that Tyler was not then mentally ill, Michigan denied his attempt to purchase a fire-
arm the previous year.137 That decision was based on § 922(g)(4).138
Tyler filed suit in federal court in Michigan, claiming that § 922(g)(4) violated
his Second Amendment rights.139 The Michigan district court granted the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Second Amendment did not extend to
someone in Tyler’s position.140 Moreover, the district court argued that even if Tyler
did fall under the Second Amendment’s protection, the level of scrutiny for deter-
mining the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) would be intermediate scrutiny.141 The
district court held that § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny because intermedi-
ate scrutiny only requires that there be a “reasonable fit” and “not a perfect fit”
between the statutory scheme and the government’s important interest in “prevent-
ing firearm violence, public safety, and reducing self-inflicted violence.”142
Section 922(g)(4) provides that the possession of a firearm by any person “who
has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental
institution” is unlawful.143 That statute does not itself define “adjudicated as a mental
defective” or “committed to a mental institution.”144 The ATF Federal Regulations,
however, define a person as having been “[a]djudicated as a mental defective” when
a “lawful authority” finds “that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelli-
gence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to
himself or to others; or (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.”145 The Regulations state that a person has been “[c]ommitted to a mental
institution” when there has been a “formal commitment of a person to a mental in-
stitution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority.”146 This includes
involuntary commitments, but not persons committed merely for observation or
voluntarily admitted to a mental institution.147
Though § 922(g)(4) would appear to permanently strip an individual falling
under it of her Second Amendment rights, Congress has provided for relief from
137 Id.
138 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012).
139 Tyler I, 755 F.3d at 315. Tyler also brought Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims in the suit in district court, but the Sixth Circuit panel did not discuss those
claims. Id.
140 Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29,
2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308
(6th Cir. 2014).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 § 922(g)(4).
144 Id.
145 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2014).
146 Id.
147 Id.
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these disabilities and a rehabilitation of the rights so restricted.148 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)
provides that a person prohibited from possessing a firearm may apply to the Attorney
General for relief, which the Attorney General may grant if the individual is not likely
to pose a danger to himself or others.149 In 1992, Congress defunded this program, and,
in 2008, authorized federal grants to states to help them determine which individuals
should be relieved of these disabilities, but only if the states had implemented their own
relief from disabilities program.150 Currently, only about half of the states have imple-
mented such a program, with Michigan being among those states that have not.151
Congress, in enacting § 922(g), intended to ban possession of firearms by
classes of individuals that it considered dangerous—either as threats to others or
threats to themselves.152 Can these restrictions be justified as either important or
compelling government interests?153 If the purpose of these restrictions is to prevent
injuries and deaths due to gun violence, it seems the government interest is not only
important, but compelling.154 In the United States in 2013, there were 11,208 deaths
due to homicide by firearm.155 In the same year, the number of suicides by firearm
was almost double that of homicides, at 21,175.156 The number of deaths due to ac-
cidental discharge of firearms was 505.157 These numbers suggest that preventing
gun violence is an important and compelling government interest.158 The compelling
government interest requirement of strict scrutiny was thus met in Tyler’s case, ac-
cording to the Sixth Circuit panel in Tyler I.159
148 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2012).
149 Id.
150 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
151 Id. at 313.
152 See United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 605 (11th Cir. 1990).
153 The Sixth Circuit panel accepted that prevention of harm and death by firearm is a
compelling government interest, and only struck down § 922(g)(4) as applied to Tyler on the
grounds that it is not narrowly tailored to that interest. Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 331. In Tyler II,
the Sixth Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny, similarly held that prevention of harm and
death by firearms was an important and legitimate government interest—indeed, a compel-
ling one. Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“These interests are not only
legitimate, they are compelling.”).
154 See Vars & Young, supra note 91, at 12 (“The government obviously has a compelling
interest in preventing firearm deaths.”).
155 Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 41 tbl.10
(2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/434G-U25N].
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Though the number of deaths by accidental discharge of firearms and homicide by fire-
arms were lower in 2013 than they were in 2009, the number of suicides by firearms in 2013
increased by 2,440 deaths over 2009 numbers. Vars & Young, supra note 91, at 13 (reporting,
in 2009, 554 accidental firearms deaths, 18,735 gun suicides, and 11,493 gun homicides).
159 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015) (“We have no trouble concluding that § 922(g)(4), which
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Applying strict scrutiny, the Sixth Circuit panel held, in Tyler I, that § 922(g)(4)
was not narrowly tailored to achieve these interests.160 The court found that Tyler
was not mentally ill at the time of his attempt to purchase a firearm or at the time of
trial.161 Because Michigan had not implemented a relief from disabilities program,
the court held that § 922(g)(4) did not survive strict scrutiny, and, thus, was uncon-
stitutional as applied to Tyler.162
Recall that in Heller, Justice Scalia argued that under any level of scrutiny the
District of Columbia handgun law would fail.163 Moreover, the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(4) as applied to Tyler may not have turned solely on a determination of the
level of scrutiny,164 but this does not mean that other laws restricting Second Amend-
ment rights or the same law in different circumstances also would not. Indeed, Vars
and Young, considering a number of scrutiny approaches of varying strength in the
context of mental health restrictions, convincingly argue that the level of scrutiny
would frequently make a difference in the restriction’s permissibility.165 It appears
that Justice Breyer was correct: “The question matters.”166
III. INTERMEDIATE VS. STRICT SCRUTINY
If the scrutiny question matters, which standard is appropriate? The appropriate
level of scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges is intermediate scrutiny. The
general approach taken by the Courts of Appeals since Heller has been overwhelm-
ingly in favor of intermediate scrutiny—a deferential approach, similar in spirit to
that advocated by Justice Breyer in his Heller dissent.167 Of course, favoring inter-
mediate scrutiny over strict scrutiny in the Courts of Appeals is not an argument that
strict scrutiny is necessarily doctrinally inappropriate. However, from a practical
standpoint, that the vast majority of the circuits have adopted intermediate scrutiny
is a strong prima facie argument in its favor. The vast majority of circuit courts have
found intermediate scrutiny to be a doctrinally appropriate and workable framework
for Second Amendment challenges.168 If the Supreme Court were to take up the
prohibits possession of firearms by individuals ‘adjudicated as a mental defective’ or who
have ‘been committed to a mental institution,’ furthers compelling interests.”).
160 Id. at 334.
161 See id. at 314.
162 Id. at 343.
163 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). But see id. at 687–88
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
164 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 323 (stating that the scrutiny question is “likely more important
in theory than in practice”).
165 Vars & Young, supra note 91, at 16–22 (arguing that a variety of possible restrictions
on gun possession by the mentally ill would have different constitutionality outcomes on the
basis of reasonableness, intermediate scrutiny, and burden-based standards).
166 Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 See infra Section III.A.
168 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 329.
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scrutiny question in a future case, this lower court precedent would likely be a
strong motivation for the Court to adopt this framework as well. Moreover, as
pointed out below, this preference for intermediate over strict scrutiny has not gen-
erally led to the kind of judicial activism the majority in Heller feared would arise
under an approach that allows for judicial deference to legislatures.169
These considerations present a strong prima facie case for the application of
intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges. In the absence of a pre-
scription on scrutiny from the Supreme Court, and with most circuits opting for
intermediate scrutiny, this argument shifts the burden to any court that seeks to
apply the more stringent strict scrutiny in such cases. In this sense, intermediate
scrutiny should be thought of as the default level of scrutiny of Second Amendment
challenges—this default being abandoned only when arguments to the contrary
support strict scrutiny.
The Sixth Circuit panel attempted to meet this burden by advancing several
arguments that strict scrutiny is generally preferable to intermediate scrutiny in
Second Amendment challenges.170 For various reasons discussed below, all of these
arguments fail. Additionally, the argument for strict scrutiny may necessarily fail
because, given Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language, strict scrutiny in Second
Amendment challenges is doctrinally impossible when the challenged law concerns
one of the exceptions.171
The first section provides a tour of the Courts of Appeals’ Second Amendment
jurisprudence; details their application of intermediate scrutiny in Second Amend-
ment challenges; discusses the Sixth Circuit en banc decision in Tyler II; and draws
some lessons from this tour.172 The second section considers and rebuts three argu-
ments in favor of strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny.173 Finally, the possibility
of a bifurcation in scrutiny application is discussed and rejected.174
A. A Tour of the Circuits and Tyler II
The Sixth Circuit panel acknowledged that “[t]he strongest argument in favor
of intermediate scrutiny is that the other circuits have adopted it.”175 The Sixth
Circuit sitting en banc also seemed to bolster its argument that intermediate scrutiny
is the appropriate standard of review by noting the “near unanim[ity]” among the
169 See generally Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the
Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012).
170 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 326–28.
171 See infra Section III.B.
172 See infra Section III.A.
173 See infra Section III.B.
174 See infra Section III.C.
175 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 324. The court noted, however, that, while the other circuits have
largely adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard, things are less tidy than
they seem. Id.
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other circuits on the issue.176 The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all
held that certain sections of 18 U.S.C. § 922 are subject to intermediate scrutiny.177
The First Circuit held that § 922(g)(9), which categorically bans gun possession for
domestic violence misdemeanants, is subject to intermediate scrutiny.178 Impor-
tantly, this particular ban required a “‘strong showing,’ necessitating a substantial
relationship between the restriction and an important governmental objective.”179
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, while applying intermediate scrutiny in certain
cases, apply strict scrutiny in others.180 The Fourth Circuit, following its previous
ruling in United States v. Chester,181 held that intermediate scrutiny applied “when
reviewing a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).”182 When con-
sidering a law burdening the “core right of self-defense in the home,” however, strict
scrutiny should be applied.183
The Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to § 922(g)(9) and held that intermedi-
ate scrutiny, and not strict scrutiny, applied.184 The court, three months later, clarified
this holding, stating that “intermediate scrutiny applied only because the conduct [regu-
lated by the statute] fell within the scope of the Second Amendment but ‘outside [its]
core.’”185 This implies that strict scrutiny may apply when the core of the Second
Amendment right—to keep a firearm in the home for self-defense—is implicated.
In United States v. Skoien,186 the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
appropriate level of scrutiny requires “some form of strong showing.”187 The court
equated this form of “strong showing” to a form of intermediate scrutiny demanding
that § 922(g)(9) be “substantially related to an important governmental objective”—
that is, pass intermediate scrutiny.188 In Skoien, the defendant had two previous
misdemeanor domestic violence convictions.189 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), therefore,
forbade Skoien from carrying a firearm in interstate commerce.190 Skoien was
176 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
177 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 324–25.
178 United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011)).
179 Id.
180 See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469–70 (4th Cir. 2011).
181 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010).
182 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 469.
183 Id. at 470.
184 United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
187 (2014).
185 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 325 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742
F.3d 1144, 1168 n.15 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)),
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
186 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011).
187 Id. at 641.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 639.
190 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012)).
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informed of this rule, but while on probation he was found to be in possession of
three firearms.191 The court considered a number of social science studies finding
that individuals who have been violent in the past are more likely to be violent again.192
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit held that § 922(g)(9) passed
constitutional muster.193 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Skoien has been a particu-
larly influential application of this type of approach.194 Though Judge Easterbrook
called for “some form of strong showing,”195 the form of intermediate scrutiny
adopted in Skoien is “not a particularly demanding one.”196
The remaining circuits have all applied some form of intermediate scrutiny in
challenges to various sections of 18 U.S.C. § 922.197 Some of these circuits, for
example, the Fourth and Ninth, have cautioned that the particular form of scrutiny
applicable (intermediate or strict) may depend on the degree to which the law in
question burdens the right, with greater burdens receiving a more demanding level
of review.198 None, however, have explicitly adopted strict scrutiny as the general
level of scrutiny as the Sixth Circuit panel did in Tyler I.199 The Sixth Circuit concluded,
“[t]he general trend . . . has been in favor of some form of intermediate scrutiny.”200
Upon rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit joined the other circuits in applying
intermediate scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge when it held that “[i]nter-
mediate scrutiny is preferable in evaluating challenges to § 922(g)(4) and similar
prohibitions.”201 The court noted that the inherent risk to others posed by the right
191 Id.
192 Id. at 642, 652 n.13.
193 Id. at 642–44.
194 Rostron, supra note 169, at 744.
195 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
196 Rostron, supra note 169, at 746.
197 See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives (NRA I), 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1364 (2014);
Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244 (2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1158 (2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).
198 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying a form of
scrutiny stronger than that applied in Skoien “if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’”); Skoien, 614 F.3d
at 641 (applying intermediate scrutiny when the core of the Second Amendment right was
not implicated). But see United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that § 922(g)(9) burdens conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment
and applying intermediate scrutiny), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 187 (2014).
199 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 324–26, 328 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining holdings of other
circuits and concluding that strict scrutiny should be applied), vacated, reh’g en banc
granted, No. 13-1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
200 Id. at 326 (emphasis added); see also Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (noting the near unanimity among the circuits in applying intermediate scrutiny to
Second Amendment challenges).
201 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 692 (citing Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th
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of self-defense by the use of firearms warrants application of intermediate scrutiny
to § 922(g)(4), which gives Congress the necessary “considerable flexibility to regulate
gun safety.”202 Interestingly, the court rejected Tyler’s argument that § 922(g)(4)
burdens the core of his Second Amendment right.203 The court did not explicitly say,
however, that strict scrutiny would have applied had it found that § 922(g)(4) bur-
dened the core of the Second Amendment right.204 However, the court’s discussion
of the degree to which § 922(g)(4) burdens Tyler’s rights suggests that it left open
the possibility that strict scrutiny may apply in a different set of circumstances, or
when a different gun regulation is at issue.205
Finally, in applying intermediate scrutiny to Tyler’s circumstances, the court
held that the governmental interest behind § 922(g)—“keep[ing] firearms out of the
hands of presumptively risky people”206—was legitimate, and even compelling.207
However, the court could not conclude that the government had met its burden of
showing that § 922(g)(4) was substantially related to this legitimate and compelling
interest.208 The government’s evidence, based on the record before the court, did not
“indicat[e] [a] continued risk presented by people who were involuntarily committed
many years ago and who have no history of intervening mental illness.”209 There-
fore, the court reversed the district court, holding that Tyler had a viable Second
Amendment claim, and remanded the case to the district court for application of
intermediate scrutiny.210
The tour above shows that the courts, in opting for intermediate scrutiny, have
been guided by a principal of judicial restraint—finding that most gun regulations
pass constitutional muster even on Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment.211 This restraint suggests that the courts have taken a more deferential ap-
proach to Second Amendment challenges. This approach is best. The problem of
Cir. 2015) (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny makes sense in the Second Amendment context . . . .
[Intermediate scrutiny] appropriately places the burden on the government to justify its re-
strictions, while also giving governments considerable flexibility to regulate gun safety.”
(citation omitted))).
202 Id. (quoting Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1126).
203 Id. at 691 (“To hold, as Tyler requests, that he is at the core of the Second Amendment
despite his history of mental illness would cut too hard against Congress’s power to
categorically prohibit certain presumptively dangerous people from gun ownership.”).
204 See id.
205 See id. (discussing how § 922(g)(4) “burdens only a narrow class of individuals who
are not at the core of the Second Amendment”).
206 Id. at 693 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983)).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 699.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Rostron, supra note 120, at 708 (“The lower courts have essentially made judicial
restraint their guiding principle.”).
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gun violence arises in myriad forms and for a variety of reasons. Legislatures, seek-
ing its reduction, are set with a daunting task.
Because a deferential approach is preferable, intermediate scrutiny rather than
strict scrutiny better tracks not only the explicit statements of courts as to what level
of scrutiny they apply, but also seems motivated by this underlying guiding judicial
principal. Recall that the Heller majority was concerned that the approach advocated
by Justice Breyer in his dissent would largely eviscerate the right protected by the
Second Amendment because that approach gave too much leeway to judges.212 The
tour of the circuits suggests otherwise.213 Though the lower courts may have not
adopted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach in letter, they have adopted it
in spirit.214 That adoption has led to a form of judicial restraint in which the interme-
diate scrutiny standard “pushes more of the job of evaluating gun control laws away
from judges and back to legislators.”215
This result, along with the near unanimity amongst the circuits in applying
intermediate scrutiny, suggests that any court opting to apply the more demanding
standard of strict scrutiny bears the substantial burden of showing its application is
justified. In a sense, with the Heller Court’s silence on the matter, the lower courts
over the years have established intermediate scrutiny as the “default” level of review
for Second Amendment challenges.
B. The Arguments for Strict Scrutiny and Why They Fail
In Tyler I, the Sixth Circuit panel presented several arguments in favor of strict
scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny.216 None of the arguments rely on any of the
specific facts in Tyler I, nor do they rely on the particular statutory scheme at issue.217
The arguments are general enough that, if successful, they would have broad im-
plications for Second Amendment jurisprudence. For this reason, it is instructive to
see why each of them fails. Although the following arguments in favor of strict
scrutiny fail, some Courts of Appeals have held that both levels of scrutiny may
apply, depending on whether a core or non-core Second Amendment right is
implicated.218 The possibility for a bifurcation in Second Amendment jurisprudence
is therefore left open. For reasons discussed below, there should be no bifurcation
in the level of scrutiny applied depending on the nature of the Second Amendment
right implicated.219
212 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
213 See supra notes 175–210 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 175–210 and accompanying text.
215 Rostron, supra note 120, at 750.
216 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 326–29 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
217 See id.
218 See supra Section III.A.
219 See infra Section III.C.
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Importantly, although the Tyler II court held that strict scrutiny did not apply to
§ 922(g)(4),220 the court did not address the Tyler I court’s arguments in favor of
strict scrutiny in reaching that result.221 To the extent these arguments could be
utilized in an appropriate future case before the Supreme Court, it is useful to see
how they fail, and therefore, ought not to persuade the Court to adopt strict scrutiny.
As the Supreme Court noted in McDonald, “the right to keep and bear arms . . .
[is a] fundamental right[ ] necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”222 From this,
the Sixth Circuit panel concluded that this “strong language” suggests that strict
scrutiny is applicable to restrictions on the right to bear arms.223 The Supreme Court
has never stated exactly what makes a right fundamental, but one possibility is that
the Second Amendment is among the so-called “preferred rights,” which “include
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to vote, the right to marry, and the
right to privacy.”224 The Tyler I court conceded that even the First Amendment right
of freedom of speech does not always trigger strict scrutiny.225 This is not the only
area where a fundamental right does not trigger strict scrutiny.226 With respect to the
right to privacy, the Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey227 characterized the right at issue as “central to personal dignity and auton-
omy” and “central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”228 And
yet, in that case, the Supreme Court applied the Undue Burden Test, which most
commentators consider to be less stringent, and more deferential, than strict scru-
tiny.229 The Court also applied a standard less demanding than strict scrutiny to the
right recognized in Lawrence v. Texas,230 which, though not clearly labeled “funda-
mental,” is considered by many commentators to be part of the same line of reason-
ing initiated in Griswold v. Connecticut231 and continued through Roe v. Wade.232
These considerations show that the Supreme Court is more than willing to apply
standards other than strict scrutiny to fundamental rights.233 Proponents of such an
220 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 692 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
221 See generally id.
222 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
223 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 326 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
224 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 698 (2007).
225 Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 326.
226 See infra text accompanying notes 227–33.
227 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
228 Id. at 851.
229 See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 224, at 699.
230 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
231 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
232 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Winkler, supra note 224, at 699.
233 Though fundamental rights do not always call for strict scrutiny, it is instructive to con-
sider the empirical evidence about the survival rate of challenged laws affecting fundamental
rights. In his 2006 study, Adam Winkler found that such laws survive strict scrutiny in only
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argument would fail to adequately appreciate the amount of variation in the levels
of scrutiny the Supreme Court has applied in cases concerning fundamental rights.
Thus, the argument that the “fundamental right” language in Heller and McDonald
suggests that strict scrutiny is preferable to intermediate scrutiny is without merit.
Second, the Sixth Circuit panel argued that the Heller Court “strongly indicated
that intermediate scrutiny should not be employed.”234 The crux of the panel’s argu-
ment is that intermediate scrutiny is simply the interest-balancing approach suggested
by Justice Breyer in his dissent and explicitly disavowed by the majority.235 There-
fore, intermediate scrutiny is not applicable to Second Amendment challenges.
It is not entirely clear that Justice Breyer’s proposal equates to intermediate scru-
tiny as traditionally conceived (though, it is almost certainly closer to intermediate
scrutiny than to strict).236 This argument may conflate the two approaches in order
to make the syllogistic leap from “the Court has rejected Justice Breyer’s interest-
balancing approach” to “the Court has rejected intermediate scrutiny.”
This problem notwithstanding, the argument appears to prove too much. Strict
scrutiny involves interest balancing as well. That is, the basic “logic” of intermediate
scrutiny analysis and strict scrutiny analysis is very similar. The two standards
differ, substantively, in the stringency of the requirements for the strength of the
government’s interest in restricting the right in question and the degree of fit be-
tween the way the restriction is implemented and the government’s goal.237 It seems
that both levels of scrutiny involve a means-end analysis and, at least, some element
of balancing interests.238 If interest balancing of any kind is dispreferred, it is not
clear how strict scrutiny does not meet with the same difficulty the court claims
intermediate scrutiny meets with in this respect. The argument applies just as well
to strict scrutiny; in that sense, the argument proves too much and is self-defeating.
The Sixth Circuit panel also argued that “intermediate scrutiny . . . has no basis
in the Constitution.”239 For this to be an argument in favor of strict scrutiny as op-
posed to intermediate scrutiny, the argument must not apply equally to strict scru-
tiny. That is, if there is also no constitutional basis for strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny
would succumb to the same argument. Or, if one accepted the argument as applying
to strict scrutiny, but nevertheless claimed that strict scrutiny is independently
twenty-four percent of cases (n=46) where fundamental rights are at stake. Winkler, supra
note 65, at 815. Therefore, because the right protected by the Second Amendment is treated
by the Court as a fundamental right, a restriction like § 922(g)(4) is more likely than not to
be struck down under strict scrutiny.
234 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 328 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 13-
1876 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).
235 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
236 See id. at 688–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
237 See Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 323.
238 See id.
239 Id. at 328.
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motivated in these cases, one has to show that intermediate scrutiny does not receive
similar, independent motivation.
This argument suffers a fate similar to the previous one: it proves too much. The
term “strict scrutiny” is not found anywhere in the Constitution.240 Nor is the general
nature of the test found there in other terminology.241 Therefore, the argument from
a lack of constitutional basis applies to strict scrutiny as well. Moreover, if the
previous counter-arguments are correct, there are no sufficient independent reasons
for applying strict scrutiny that outweigh those for applying intermediate scrutiny.
Therefore, this argument, like the previous three, fails to establish the primacy of
strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges.
Finally, there are some reasons to doubt that strict scrutiny is possible if the
“presumptively lawful” exceptions are to be upheld. Carlton Larson attempts to
“reverse engineer” a standard of scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges.242 In
particular, he attempts to find a standard that fits with the “presumptively lawful”
exceptions mentioned by the Heller Court—of which mental illness is one.243
Larson’s argument is somewhat cryptic, and requires some unpacking, but is,
essentially, as follows: We must accept the exceptions to Second Amendment rights
protection (e.g., exceptions for felonies; the mentally ill), though this language is
dicta.244 Laws banning the possession of guns for the mentally ill would likely fail
strict scrutiny because, though the governmental interest of preventing the mentally
ill from harming themselves or others is a compelling interest, many manifestations
of restrictions aimed at achieving this goal would not satisfy strict scrutiny’s re-
quirement of narrow tailoring.245 If laws such as § 922(g)(4) cannot withstand strict
scrutiny, then they are not permissible restrictions on Second Amendment rights.246
The Supreme Court, however, has said that these restrictions are “presumptively
lawful,” and so the Court could not have meant (or, at least, it is doctrinally difficult
to make the claim) that strict scrutiny should apply in these cases.247
To sum up, all these arguments in favor of strict, over intermediate, scrutiny fail.
In the face of independent arguments in favor of intermediate scrutiny, and its wide-
spread application in the Courts of Appeals, these arguments do not meet the burden
of showing that strict scrutiny is generally preferable to intermediate scrutiny. It
240 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 63, at 1268.
241 See id. (observing that there is no “textual basis, nor any foundation in the Consti-
tution’s original understanding, for the modern test under which legislation will be upheld
against constitutional challenge only if ‘necessary’ or ‘narrowly tailored’ to promote a ‘com-
pelling’ governmental interest” (footnote omitted)).
242 See Larson, supra note 125, at 1373.
243 See id.; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
244 See Larson, supra note 125, at 1372.
245 See id.
246 See id. at 1371–72.
247 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 n.26.
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remains to be determined if both levels of scrutiny are applicable, depending on the
manner in which a law affects the Second Amendment right. Many circuits have
expressly held as much,248 and the Sixth Circuit in Tyler II left open this possibility.249
C. Both Intermediate Scrutiny and Strict Scrutiny?
Having argued that strict scrutiny is not generally preferable to intermediate
scrutiny in the Second Amendment context, one must consider whether Second
Amendment jurisprudence should contemplate strict scrutiny when the law burdens
“the core” of the Second Amendment right.250 The question then becomes whether
such a bifurcation in Second Amendment scrutiny analysis is necessary to protect
the core right. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that the application of strict
scrutiny is appropriate when the law in question implicates the core of the Second
Amendment right.251 As seen above, in Tyler II, the Sixth Circuit held that § 922(g)(4)
did not burden Tyler’s core Second Amendment right.252 Nevertheless, the court’s
analysis leading to its holding that § 922(g)(4) warrants intermediate scrutiny was
couched in terms of determining the degree to which the statute burdened the Second
Amendment right.253 It stands to reason that, had either a different statute or a differ-
ent set of facts been before the Tyler II court, the court may have found strict scrutiny
appropriate if the statute implicated the core of the Second Amendment right.
The “core” of the Second Amendment is the right of individuals to keep a fire-
arm in the home for self-defense.254 However, simply because a statute implicates
the core Second Amendment right, it does not necessarily follow that strict scrutiny
must apply in order to secure the Amendment’s protections. Therefore, no such
bifurcation of the scrutiny analysis is necessary—a single standard approach is
sufficient. The reason lies in the nature of intermediate scrutiny itself.
Because intermediate scrutiny is not a unitary standard, judges have a degree of lee-
way in its application.255 At the demanding end of the spectrum, a judge might require
248 See supra Section III.A.
249 See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2011).
251 See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1168 n.15 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Intermediate scrutiny is not appropriate, however, for cases involving the destruction of
a right at the core of the Second Amendment.”), rev’d, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc); Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 469 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to laws burdening
the “core right of self-defense in the home”).
252 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 691 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
253 Id.
254 See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 469 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to laws bur-
dening the “core right of self-defense in the home”).
255 See Rostron, supra note 169, at 746 (“Although courts sometimes refer to intermediate
scrutiny as though it is a single or unitary standard, a judge purporting to apply intermediate
scrutiny actually has a variety of options for how to proceed.” (footnotes omitted)).
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scientific proof that the restriction reduces gun violence; at the less demanding end of
the spectrum, a judge might require merely a plausible theory of how the restriction
reduces the danger of gun violence.256 Requiring more information at the demanding
end of the spectrum, and subjecting the law to a stronger showing of intermediate
scrutiny, is thus likely to secure the Second Amendment’s fundamental, core right.
When the core of the Second Amendment is implicated by a gun restriction law,
the stronger, more demanding reading of intermediate scrutiny should be triggered.
When the core of the Second Amendment is not so implicated, the weaker reading
should be applied. This approach solves two of the key problems created by the
Court’s opinion in Heller: (1) failure to provide an analytical framework that allows
for appropriate deference to the legislatures’ gun control measures, while (2) ac-
knowledging and respecting that the core of the Second Amendment requires
stronger protection from such legislation.257 Strict scrutiny provides the wrong
solution to the first problem, and it is unnecessary to solve the second.
CONCLUSION
It is time for the Supreme Court to decide the scrutiny question in Second
Amendment challenges. Eight years have passed since District of Columbia v.
Heller,258 and six have passed since McDonald v. City of Chicago.259 During this
time, the Court has not settled the scrutiny question.
The question matters. The purely historical approach advocated by a small mi-
nority of judges is difficult to apply and of little help, particularly in the area of
mental health.260 The question also matters because the outcome of a case likely
depends on how deferential a treatment the court gives to the legislature.261 Interme-
diate scrutiny, having a less demanding “fit” requirement, is more deferential to
legislatures than strict scrutiny. This deference is more likely to result in the chal-
lenged law being upheld. It also provides Congress and the States with the means
to take prophylactic measures to curb gun violence perpetrated by certain groups
which are more disposed to do so.262
The Heller majority’s concerns with judicial discretion notwithstanding, an
approach to scrutiny which is deferential to legislatures is preferable.263 The complex
fact-driven basis for crafting effective gun restriction legislation requires such an
approach if important, and compelling, government interests are to be served. An
256 See id. at 746–47.
257 See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
258 Id.
259 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
260 See supra Section II.A.
261 See supra Section I.A.
262 See supra Section I.A.
263 See supra Section I.A.
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approach similar in spirit to Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach is better
suited to achieving this goal.264 Though Justice Breyer does not identify his approach
as intermediate scrutiny, the tour of the Courts of Appeals shows that almost all cir-
cuits generally apply intermediate scrutiny.265 Intermediate scrutiny is more deferen-
tial to legislators than strict scrutiny, and thus fits within the general approach advocated
by Justice Breyer.266 Moreover, because the above arguments for generally applying
strict scrutiny fail, intermediate scrutiny is the correct standard in Second Amend-
ment challenges.267
Because intermediate scrutiny is not a unitary standard, it admits strong and
weak readings.268 Falling along a spectrum, how substantially related the law must
be to furthering the government’s important interest is determined by whether or not
the law implicates the Second Amendment’s core right.269 Laws burdening the core
of the right should be subject to a more demanding form of intermediate scrutiny.270
Those burdening conduct outside the core should be subject to a less demanding
form, such as that applied by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien.271 This
approach to intermediate scrutiny renders strict scrutiny unnecessary in the Second
Amendment context. Moreover, strict scrutiny’s application is likely to render nec-
essary and effective firearm regulation unconstitutional. Strict scrutiny, therefore,
has no place in Second Amendment jurisprudence.
264 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265 See supra Section III.A.
266 See generally Rostron, supra note 169.
267 See supra Section III.B.
268 See supra Section III.C.
269 See Rostron, supra note 169, at 746, 754.
270 See supra Section III.C.
271 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011).
